ABOUT S.R. SHEARER

S.R. Shearer is a graduate of the University of California where he earned a Bachelor's degree (1964) and a Master's degree (1967) in history. He also attended the United States Defense Language Institute in Monterey where he studied German. From 1967 to 1972 he served as an intelligence officer in Europe; in Vietnam he served with the 525^th Intelligence Group (see note below), Special Operations Branch and at the Phoenix School at Vung Tau (see note below); he earned the Bronze Star, and the Joint Services Commendation Medal for intelligence information he developed and PERSONALLY briefed to General Creighton Abrams, Commander of all forces in Vietnam, and Ambassador Colby, CIA Station Chief in Vietnam (later head of the CIA); the information that he developed was also briefed to the American Delegation at the Paris Peace Talks. Shearer held Top Secret, Special Intelligence, Codeword security, Eyes Only clearances; also Cosmic, NATO and Atomic clearances.

NOTE: Please see information below on the 525^th Intelligence Group; please also see information below on the Phoenix Program. [The information below is not secret and was taken from the "public domain."]

He returned to the United States and joined the 515^th Counter-Intelligence Group which was in charge of all counter-intelligence operations on the West Coast. In 1972, disturbed by all that he had seen, he resigned his commission and left the army to become a co-pastor for a "Jesus People" type church in Washington D.C. which was dedicated to preaching the Gospel to the "street people" in Georgetown (District of Columbia).

Over the years, Shearer has been reviled as being too severe and abrasive in his criticism of the church and the United States; someone who refuses to countenance weakness in others. Almost all of his friends have left him, and he is subjected to an endless stream of calumnies by his enemies - but that's probably as it should be:

"... The prophet is a troublesome ... voice, hated by the church's leaders and out of favor with the church's members. Like a wild, ragged, unkempt coyote scenting from afar the smell of carrion, like a raven always croaking out the same cry, like a ... wolf howling on the mountain top, the prophet travels throughout the church ... followed by suspicion and hatred... He is ... a man who sees with a troubled heart - but with clear eyes - the compromises the church is making with the world today, and the consequences that will accrue to it tomorrow ... as a result. Like all truthtellers who disturb the slumbering majority and who unsettle the peace of the church's leadership, he is avoided like a leper, persecuted like an enemy and those with a reputation in the church for 'being somebody' detest him. The prophet is an accuser, but today's Christians do not want to admit their guilt. He is an intercessor, but Christians do not want to be shown their error ... He is an announcer, but Christians do not want to hear ..."

Since leaving the intelligence community, Steve has been involved almost continually in full-time ministry to the Lord. He has been married to his wife, Lucy, for almost fifty years, has three children, and six grandchildren.

Steve came to know the Lord in a small home meeting while he was a student at the University of California in December 21, 1959 largely as the result of the testimony of one of his college fraternity brothers at Kappa Sigma. It was the height of the Cold War, Dwight Eisenhower was president and what we refer today as "Traditional America" - the America of "Leave It to Beaver" - was still very much an everyday reality to millions of Americans throughout the country. The Vietnam War was still four years away, the Civil Right's Movement had not yet gained national prominence, the Berlin Wall had not yet been built, there was no National Organization of Women, abortion was still illegal, the draft was still a part of every man's "rite of passage," female college students were still subject to on-campus "lockouts" and "curfews," there was still prayer in the school, there was no "Gay Right's Movement" and the country was still ostensibly a "Christian nation."

Eleven days later all that started to change - the 1960s began. Today it's hard to believe that there was ever anything like on-campus "lockouts" and curfews for female college students, school prayer, etc. It all seems so unreal - and countless numbers of today's Christians are prone to look back wistfully to that age as a "simpler and happier" time. But was it really? - or was it just a facade? a chimera? a dream? - a "bill of goods" dreamed up by today's religious right with little bearing on reality. The fact of the matter is, it was probably more facade than reality, more fake than substance.

Yes, outwardly the nation was much more a Christian nation then, than it is today; but how much reality was there behind the outward structure of that era's religion? - not much. People went to church, but most did so more out of convention than conviction; more because "it was the thing to do" than anything else. The term "born-again" was not even a part of the American lexicon, and most so-called Christians of the time wouldn't have had any idea what such a term meant. Most young people of that age had long ago seen through their parent's religious facade, and by the time they began flowing onto the campuses of the nation's colleges and universities, they were ready to "chuck it in." Most wanted nothing to do with the empty life-style and vacuous religiosity of their parents' lives. Eisenhower was a fake, a man who had been willing to leave over two thousand American GIs in communist hands - and lie about it to the American people - in order to secure peace on the Korean peninsula; blacks were a denigrated minority portrayed to millions of American whites as little more than witless, comedic caricatures; countless numbers of American businesses like the United Fruit Company thought nothing of enslaving the people of whole nations in order to turn a profit for their American masters; McCarthy era demagogues thought little of consigning whole classes of people (socialists, labor leaders, etc.) to the trash bin of society on the slightest suggestion that they were "un-American;" etc.

But while the vacuous nature of that era's religiosity produced cynicism, it also produced an insatiable desire on the part of many to search for truth - and while cynicism led many college students of that era into the mindless narcissism of the drug culture and the so-called "sexual revolution," it led others into a search for a deeper meaning to life - a search which finally led to the "Jesus Revolution" of the late 1960s and early '70s - a revolution which owed NOTHING to the established denominations of that day, a revolution which occurred almost totally "outside of religion," and a revolution which was, to a large degree, opposed by most of the denominations of that period - not only by the mainline denominations, but the evangelicals as well.

It is an extremely unfortunate fact of life that much of the history of the "Jesus Revolution" has been rewritten - rewritten largely to accommodate the sensibilities of those evangelicals who had opposed the revolution in the first place. Today the "Jesus Revolution" has - to a large degree - been incorporated by the religious establishment, and "institutionalized" within that establishment. Indeed, if one reads most of today's histories which deal with the "Jesus Revolution" one could very well come away with the view that the revolution had been produced by, and had emanated out from, the very religious establishment which had at first opposed it - i.e., Multnomah School of the Bible, Dallas Theological Seminary, Western Seminary, Wheaton, etc. But that simply isn't the case! The "Jesus Revolution" occurred DESPITE these institutions, not because of them.

The truth of the matter is, when the Spirit of God moves, He invariably has to move outside of the religious establishment, not within it. The "Jesus Revolution" had its genesis not within the church buildings of the fundamentalist and Pentecostal bodies of that era, but rather in small home meetings scattered across the country. Indeed, the aversion of most of the people who came to the Lord in those days against the religious establishment of that era was so great that there would probably have been no "Jesus Revolution" had it been decreed from somewhere that it had to occur within the church buildings and other confines of the religious structures of that period - and this has always been the case. It's no accident that in His day, Jesus operated from a perspective that was totally outside of and at variance with the established religion of His day - so much so that the religious leaders of that day felt impelled to crucify Him in order to end the perceived threat He seemed to constitute against their security.

So also today! It's futile for people to look to the evangelical establishment of today for their salvation. The fact is, with each passing year it is ever more becoming a part of the world that Jesus came to earth to oppose - so much so that it has even become a part of a movement to take it over. To those former members of the "Jesus Revolution," we would simply say this: remember who originally opposed you. Don't rewrite history. You probably wouldn't even be a Christian today if you had to become one inside religion rather than outside of it. Remember where your roots really are. Don't end up building the very institution which you had at the beginning so vehemently opposed - and which had so vehemently opposed you!!

In Vietnam, the theater army component intelligence collection architecture matured by the spring of 1968. There was a brigade level collection group for SIGINT and a battalion level reconnaissance photo exploitation unit. The theater level army clandestine HUMINT task was centrally managed by the 525^th Military Intelligence Group (525^th MIG).

HUMINT implies purposeful employment of human sources of information to learn things. Having a conversation with a source who is not under friendly control is not HUMINT. It is a chat.

In addition to the theater army clandestine HUMINT operation, combat arms divisions and separate brigades conducted force protection operations employing sources that were largely unvetted and untested. These activities were often conducted by the combat arms unit's counter-intelligence (CI) detachments. US Army counter-intelligence personnel in these detachments were not trained to conduct such operations and the results were of uniformly low quality and reliability. SOF activities such as the 5^th Special Forces Group and "United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observations Group" (USMACVSOG) also operated a variety of intelligence projects of varying quality. Often, the quality was directly proportional to the availability of well-qualified personnel to run them.

The major responsibility for clandestine HUMINT support to the US Army in Vietnam rested squarely on the 525^th MIG. The group employed four numbered battalions to do clandestine HUMINT collection work on both unilateral and bi-lateral bases in the Areas of Responsibility (AOR) of the Vietnamese Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) which were numbered One to Four from North to South. There was a fifth battalion in 525^th MIG responsible for countrywide and out of country operations. The 525^th MIG had other, non-HUMINT responsibilities in the area of "housekeeping" for staff personnel attached to major headquarters, etc.

The 3^rd Combat Battalion (Provisional), 525 MIG (3^rd Bn.) was responsible for an AOR which reached from the northeastern reaches of the Mekong Delta southwest of Saigon to a line about 50 miles east of Saigon and from the South China Sea to the Cambodian border inland. In reality the AOR extended into Cambodia because many of the targets addressed by the battalion's border detachments extended into Cambodia. The in-country AOR was exactly the same as that of the Vietnamese (ARVN) 3^rd Corps Tactical Zone. Someone had decided to match the 525 MIG AORs to the responsibilities of the ARVN rather than to that of "United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam" (USMACV). US maneuver forces were commanded by I Field Force and II Field Force. These were army corps level headquarters. The US maneuver forces moved around a good bit throughout the country in ways not conducive to sound clandestine HUMINT practice. Effective clandestine HUMINT operations depend on stability of personnel and operating areas for success and this may have been a major factor in this decision, as the ARVN CTZs never changed. In addition, the 525^th MIG was responsible for advising the ARVN countrywide clandestine HUMINT activity and co-extensive boundaries of AORs was undoubtedly helpful in that task.

The 3^rd Bn was organized with headquarters in Bien Hoa (near Saigon). The headquarters performed normal C2 functions and was co-located with an attached CI detachment for area support throughout 3^rd CTZ. An operations section controlled the activities of subordinate detachments in the areas of source control, planning, and funding of operations. The 3^rd Bn had an attached element from the 525^th MIG's Aviation Detachment. This element operated half a dozen helicopters in support of the 3^rd Bn's activities and was a great convenience.

The "guts" of the 3^rd Bn's activities were carried out by four clandestine HUMINT Detachments each of which had an AOR consisting of one or more South Vietnamese (SVN) Government provinces. Each detachment was commanded by a captain or major who was a clandestine HUMINT qualified and often experienced officer and was manned by military case officers (COs) of various ranks junior to the commander, as well as enlisted intelligence operations clerks whose function was to support case officer activities in report writing, file keeping and other administrative and sometimes tactical duties in defense of the position. The case officers were a mixed lot. Some were long service MI personnel who had done this work in Germany and Japan for many years. Some were bright young men selected out of the basic training pool for this work. They were subsequently trained at the Army Intelligence School at Ft. Holabird and language school before deployment and some were CIA "Career Trainees" (CTs) who were doing their military duty.

Each of the four Detachments was deployed in several team locations throughout its AOR. The four detachments were tasked from 525^th MIG and 3^rd Bn against a variety of targets. Some were general in nature, (report of all enemy activity in AOR), and some quite specific (report on the activities of enemy Line of Communications (LOC) between coordinate #### and coordinate ####). The main function of such tasking was to serve as an authorization for the expenditure of operational funds. Headquarters far away in Saigon and Bien Hoa were ill equipped to have the detailed knowledge of the situation necessary to direct operational activities at the detachment level and they had the good sense to realize that and leave detailed operational planning to detachment commanders. Successful detachment commanders understood that US Army and US Air Force activities within their AORs were their real customers. As a result detachment commanders made close and continuous liaison with both static activities (MACV Advisory Teams and USAF Forward Air Controller Teams (FAC)) and Combat Arms units temporarily located within the detachment's AOR. Tasking was sought and accepted from these directly supported activities and reports were rendered directly to them on a timely basis, normally by hand delivery. The same material was then subsequently reported electronically to higher headquarters where it contributed to the detachment's "box score" and eventually ended up at MACV J-2, PACOM and the JCS. Evaluations of the reports were sent by supported units and activities to 525^th MIG in Saigon.

Detachment A, 3rd Bn 525^th MIG (Det A) was typical in its structure and operations. Det A had teams of two to four men in six surrounded and defended Vietnamese towns in Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces on the Cambodian border directly north of Saigon. The Detachment headquarters was located in Song Be, the provincial capital of Phuoc Long Province (some times known as the Siberia of SVN). No detachment personnel were co-located with US combat arms units because such units lived in their own defended positions (Landing Zones and Fire Bases) outside the Vietnamese towns where there was no substantial access to indigenous inhabitants. 

The ability to recruit and then handle agents in this or any other situation is entirely dependent on extended access to a large group of people from whom to choose prospective sources and a continuing ability to associate with them within the protection of plausible cover. None of that existed in the "world" of the Army conventional units. Consequently it was decided to "cover" Army COs as military or civilian members of the Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) apparatus located at province and district (county) levels of the SVN government. This organization was all-pervasive throughout SVN after 1967 and had many positions for advisory personnel in military training, agriculture, government operations, medical affairs, education, etc. throughout the country. The positions for American civilian personnel were particularly difficult to fill in the very parts of the country in which enemy presence and subsequent danger were high. These were the parts of the country that the US Army was most interested in from the point of view of the need to support combat operations and therefore there was a natural symbiosis between the needs of CORDS and the needs of 525^th MIG. As a result CORDS, especially in 3^rd CTZ where John Vann was in charge, was quite willing to provide cover positions for 525^th MIG personnel so long as they did the cover work better than the "real" civilian and military CORDS people did. Vann remarked on many occasions that the COs under cover were the best workers that he had. The way this system worked was that all the 525^th MIG people were under CORDS cover in Det A's operation, including the detachment commander.

The enemy never successfully penetrated this cover arrangement in the three years of the existence of Det A, 3^rd Bn 525^th MIG. Since all Americans in these surrounded border towns were targets for assassination or elimination, there was no significant increase in the risk for non-MI personnel.

The operating locations were all very dangerous places, subject to intermittent but frequent attacks by fire and weekly ground "probes." In 1968-69, there were major ground assaults on all the Det A locations. All were defeated, but in the case of Song Be, the detachment headquarters location, the VC held 2/3rds of the town for seven days before the 1^st Cavalry Division drove them out with heavy casualties. Det A's sources and COs in the Song Be area continued to function and report throughout this episode. All US personnel of necessity took a lot of chances, but this was war and higher headquarters understood this fact.

Most of the Det A operations involved Vietnamese and Montagnard agents. The Montagnards often had to be taught the concepts of; time, distance and number before they were useful. The detachment had some Chinese and European agents. These were rubber plantation managers. The French consulate and its "Service de Documentation et Contre-Espionage" (SDECE) office in Saigon turned over to their control a rubber company apparatus of informants which had been maintained by the French Government for thirty years. It was useful. 

The detachment's operations were fully documented with operations plans, recruiting plans and contact reports in addition to the product Intelligence Information Reports (IIR). Sources were frequently tested. Singleton sources were tested directly in safe houses in situ or in the coastal cities. Many operations had to be run as principal agent networks because of the inaccessibility of primary sources deep in enemy controlled territory outside the detachment's operating locations. In these cases the principal agents were directly tested and the primary sources were usually judged on the basis of the direct combat result of the employment of their information.

When fully developed, the detachment had four commissioned officers, five warrant officers and about twenty enlisted soldiers. The detachment ran approximately one hundred agents at any given time.

Det A's operation earned high marks for productivity and accuracy. Anecdotal evidence of the performance of the 525^th MIG throughout the country indicates that not all operations were as productive. The difference in performance seems to have been largely a function of leadership.